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Abstract 
Set within the broad debate on migration, development and remittances, this paper makes a 
comparative analysis of two migration-remittance corridors in contrasting regions of the world: 
Ecuador-USA and Albania-Greece. Operating mainly at the micro-level and based on two 
questionnaire surveys of remittance receiving households supported by in-depth interviews, we 
unpack the family dynamics of remittance transfers through an analysis of person-to-person 
dyads. We pay particular attention to gender relationships – how they both shape, and are 
shaped by, migration and remittances. We develop a typology of remittance uses – ‘drip-
feeding’, debt repayment, ‘emergency’ money, gifts and in-kind transfers, collective remittances 
and social remittances – comparing results from the two studies. On the whole we find many 
similarities between the two studies, not only as regards the survey results but also in the way 
the remittance corridors are embedded within structural relationships of dependency at 
various levels.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Within the migration-development nexus, 
remittances have a crucial role to play. 
Financially and developmentally they are 
seen as a beneficent transfer from 
migrants’ destination to origin countries, 
and as a compensatory counterflow to the 
transfer of cheap and flexible labour that 
migration from poor to richer countries 
entails. Whether this dual system of labour 
flow in one direction and capital flow in the 
other helps poor countries is a moot point. 
As Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011: 1) point 
out, the ‘jury is still out’ on the relationship 
between migration and development, 
especially as regards the long-term effects 
on less-developed, migrating-sending 
countries. The interpretation of this 
‘unsettled relationship’ (Papademetriou 
1991) depends partly on context and 
situation, but also on political-economic 
ideology. De Haas (2010) and Faist and 
Fauser (2011) have described how 
ideological stance has oscillated through 
three phases over the past several 
decades.  
 
During the early post-war period 
neoclassical economic thinking saw the 
transfer of labour from poor (labour surplus) 
to industrialised and industrialising (labour 
deficit) countries as a ‘natural’ equalisation 
mechanism:  such an emigration of surplus 
labour would lead to a new equilibrium 
between capital and labour.  Meantime, 
remittances sent back by migrants to their 
families and the subsequent return of 
‘trained’ migrants with new skills and 
knowledge would boost the growth and 
economic modernisation of the poorer 
countries.  At least that was the theory, 
espoused within the European context by 
Kindleberger (1967). Whilst there seems 
little doubt that migrant workers contributed 
to the industrial development and to the 
staffing of many public services in countries 
like France, West Germany and the UK 
during the 1950s and 1960s, positive 
economic effects on the migrant-sending 
countries are more difficult to ascertain.  It 
is true that most of the Southern European 
migrant-sending countries of the postwar 
era (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece) did 
develop quite strongly in later decades, 
closing (but not completely) the 
‘development gap’ with the North European 
countries which had been receiving and 
employing their migrants; but the extent to 
which remittances and returning migrants 
contributed to this development remains 
dubious – probably tourism, some industrial 
development (especially in Northern Italy), 
intensive agriculture and membership of 
the European Community played more 
important roles. Now, these four Southern 
European countries have become major 
destinations for immigration, including 
being receiving countries for the two 
migrant nationalities that are the focus of 
 3 
this paper – Greece and Italy for Albanians, 
Spain and Italy for Ecuadorians. 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
migration-development debate shifted to a 
different paradigm – dependency theory, 
and to the ‘development of 
underdevelopment’ (Frank 1969). Via a 
vicious circle, this structuralist reading of 
the migration-development relationship 
reversed the neoclassical formulation. 
Dependency theorists saw/see migration as 
a result of international economic relations 
within the world capitalist system, but 
rather than labour transfer moving towards 
a new equilibrium, migration has merely 
exacerbated the underdevelopment of the 
‘periphery’ (Wallerstein 1974). A subplot 
within this pessimistic scenario is occupied 
by the brain drain syndrome – the loss of 
poor countries’ most educated and skilled 
persons who are hoovered up by the 
countries of the capitalist core, to the 
benefit of the latter and the 
impoverishment (in terms of lost investment 
in human capital) of the former.   
 
Remittances were seen by the dependency 
school as a source of inequality (increasing 
the gap between the not-so-poor migrant 
families and the very poor non-migrants) 
and, because of their tendency to be spent 
on ‘non-productive’ uses – above all 
housing – as hindering real structural 
change in developing countries.  The result, 
instead, was a structural dependence on 
remittances which could only be sustained 
by more migration (Lipton 1980). Although 
dependency theory fell somewhat out of 
fashion after the 1980s, it still has its 
adherents who argue passionately for its 
relevance and who see migration-as-
globalisation as a continuation of the 
economic imperialism of the global North, 
especially the United States, over the South 
(see Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; 
Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 
2011; cf. also Glick Schiller 2011).   
 
On the whole, however, the 1990s and 
2000s saw the ideological and theoretical 
pendulum swing back towards an optimistic 
interpretation of migration’s role in the 
development of poor countries. Three key 
features distinguish this latest, ‘neoliberal’ 
interpretation of the migration-development 
nexus. First, migrants’ agency is highlighted 
– migrants are no longer pawns drawn 
hither and thither by the dictates of capital 
(a feature of both the neoclassical and 
dependency theories). They are, instead, 
development agents embodied. Second, in 
the neoliberal scenario everybody benefits:  
the receiving countries (through supplies of 
cheap and flexible labour), the sending 
countries (relief of unemployment, inflow of 
remittances), and the migrants themselves 
(escape from poverty, means to build a 
sustainable future either abroad, or via 
remittances as transnational – albeit split – 
families, or as reconstituted families via 
return migration in savings). Third, 
remittances are seen as the key component 
of this ‘triple-win’ scenario (Maimbo and 
Ratha 2005), so much so that authors and 
policy wonks talk of a ‘remittances mantra’ 
(Kapur 2004). 
 
Economists and development planners see 
remittances largely in financial terms:  
macroeconomically in terms of helping to 
redress the balance of payments problems 
that poor countries suffer from and as a 
source of investment capital for 
development; microeconomically in terms of 
household and family survival and escape 
from poverty; and mesoeconomically in 
terms of exogenously boosting the growth 
potential of communities and regions, 
either through the aggregation effects of 
individual remittance-fuelled initiatives or 
via pooled remittances geared to collective 
projects. Against this ‘remittances are 
beautiful’ discourse, we feel that more 
searching questions need to be raised. We 
aim to open up the ‘black box’ of remittance 
transfers in order to expose the ‘human 
dynamics’ of these translocal socio-
economic transactions (cf. Carling 2008a; 
Kunz 2008). We focus in this paper on the 
kinship and power relationships involved 
within transnational remitting families, 
especially as regards gender and 
generations, and on developing an emic 
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typology of remittances as regards their 
uses and meaning. We set aside for the 
time being the much broader questions 
about how remittances are embedded in 
the structural dynamics of the globalised 
world economy, with its multiple inequalities 
of power and control, although we briefly 
touch on these notions in the conclusion. 
 
Our empirical evidence is drawn from two 
separate geographic contexts, or, as we 
prefer to call them, ‘migration and 
remittance corridors’: Albania-Greece and 
Ecuador-USA.  Our use of the term ‘corridor’ 
implies a linear system along which flows of 
people, money, material goods, socio-
cultural influences and human relations 
pass and interact with each other. By and 
large people go one way, as migrants, and 
money flows the other, as remittances, but 
this is far from the whole story. People 
move back and forth, some as circular 
migrants or on visits home; remittances 
may occasionally flow in the ‘reverse’ 
direction (to support migrants at critical 
moments); material goods certainly are bi-
directional (e.g. foodstuffs, clothing); as are 
the social dynamics and emotions which 
are associated with migration and 
remittances. 
 
Of our two case-studies, one is a short-
distance corridor linking two adjacent 
countries in the Balkans, the other a globe-
spanning North-South corridor between two 
countries in different hemispheres. In both 
cases we narrow down the frame of 
reference to a localised rural area of origin 
and a single urban destination (a 
municipality in southern Albania and 
Thessaloniki, a village in highland Ecuador 
and the Queens district of New York):  this 
reflects the multi-sited research design that 
both pieces of research entailed. Both 
projects consisted of questionnaire-based 
surveys of remittance-receiving households 
in the two rural areas, along with smaller 
follow-up samples of in-depth interviews 
and discussions, both with remittance-
recipients and returnees in the villages, and 
with remittance-senders in the destination 
cities. We argue that only through field 
surveys such as these can the human 
complexities of the remittance process be 
exposed. In particular we are interested in 
the recursive relationships involved:  how 
the remittance process is shaped by kinship 
structures, especially generations and 
gender; and how in turn gender and 
generational relationships are reshaped by 
remittance sending, receiving, decision-
taking and utilisation. We are also 
interested in the meanings and labels 
attached to different types of remittances 
by those directly involved. 
 
Our approach is to focus on remittance 
dynamics through two main analytical 
lenses: issues of power, gender and 
decision-making seen through a mapping of 
remittance dyads (sender-receiver pairings); 
and analysis of types of remittances and 
their meanings and uses. The first of these 
picks up fundamental questions underlying 
the remittance process:  who sends, who 
receives, who decides how much and how 
often remittances are sent, who decides 
how they are used, and who actually 
administers their deployment. Mapping out 
remittance dyads in terms of gender, 
generation and kinship links (e.g. son to 
father, husband to wife, sister to sister etc.), 
supported by in-depth interview material, 
will give insights into these questions. The 
second analytical axis develops a typology 
of remittances linked both to their nature 
and their uses (hence: ‘regular’ or ‘drip-
feeding’ remittances for family support and 
survival; savings and investment 
remittances sent irregularly for big projects 
like building a house or developing a 
business; debt repayment; ‘emergency’ 
remittances sent to cover a sudden need, 
often health-related; gifts and in-kind 
remittances; and collective remittances). 
Despite the differences in geographic 
setting, our emphasis in the comparative 
analysis is on the remarkable similarities 
between the Albanian and the Ecuadorian 
cases – although of course there are 
differences which will also be highlighted.  
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Settings:  Albania and Thessaloniki, 
Ecuador and New York 
 
The scholarly literature on remittances 
tends to be made up either of a myriad of 
individual case-studies based on single 
villages, regions or countries (far too many 
to cite) or broad-brush comparative studies 
which take a global perspective based on 
statistical data (Adams and Page 2003; 
Gammeltoft 2002; World Bank 2011). It is 
rather rare that comparative analyses are 
based on in-depth field studies. The two 
cases we examine in this paper draw on 
completely independent research projects, 
separately funded and each with its own 
rationale, yet with sufficient overlap in 
terms of research questions and methods 
to make meaningful comparisons. 
 
The Albania-Greece study was 
commissioned by the United National 
International Research and Training 
Institute for the Advancement of Women 
(UN-INSTRAW, now part of UN Women), as 
part of their programme for research on 
‘Gender and Remittances’ during 2007-09. 
Russell King was the Principal Investigator 
of this project and Julie Vullnetari the 
Research Fellow responsible for the field 
data collection and analysis. This project is 
now complete and some publications are 
either out or in press (King and Vullnetari 
2010; King et al. 2011; Vullnetari and King 
2011). As far as possible, we use material 
in this paper which does not appear in 
these other publications.  
 
The Ecuador-New York study is part of 
Diana Mata Codesal’s DPhil thesis in 
Migration Studies at the University of 
Sussex, for which Russell King is the main 
supervisor. The doctorate is funded by a 
scholarship from the Basque government. 
The thesis is currently being written up, the 
fieldwork having been completed. 
 
Albania and Ecuador have both emerged as 
prominent, indeed iconic, emigration 
countries in the past 20 or so years; each 
represents a particular set of geopolitical 
and international economic forces shaping 
 
Table 1   Albania and Ecuador: migration and remittance statistics 
 Albania  Ecuador  
Population, 2009 (millions) 3.2  13.6  
GNI per capita, 2009 (Atlas method, US$) 3,950  3,920  
GDP annual average growth, 2005-09 (%) 5.0  4.3  
Stock of emigrants, 2010 ('000) 1,438  1,148  
Emigrants as % population  45.4  8.3  
Main destination counties 
Greece, Italy, 
UK, USA 
 
USA, Spain, 
Italy  
Emigration rate of tertiary-educated (%) 9  9.5  
Remittances, 2009 (US $, millions) 1,317  2,502  
Average remittance per head of 
population 
412  184 
 
Average remittance per migrant 916   2,179   
Source: World Bank (2011: 54, 108)     
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migration over wider constellations of 
countries, respectively post-communist 
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Table 1 
sets out selected economic, demographic, 
migration and remittance figures taken 
from the latest World Bank compendium. It 
demonstrates broad similarity in terms of 
economic profiles, emigrant numbers and 
highly-educated migrants. Significant 
differences, however, are observed with 
regard to the ratio of emigrants to the 
country’s population (much higher in 
Albania) and remittance amounts (higher 
for Ecuador). The table also shows that 
whereas remittances per head of the in-
country population are more than twice as 
high for Albania, exactly the reverse is true 
in the case of remittances per migrant 
abroad, more than twice as high in Ecuador. 
 
Albanian migration to Greece 
 
Albania’s emigration started in 1990 after 
45 years of communist closure during 
which emigration was regarded as an act of 
treason. The country’s border had been 
sealed by a high electric fence and frequent 
sentry posts. Attempted escape was 
punished by lengthy imprisonment and 
even execution; retribution was also meted 
out to the families of escapees. Whilst part 
of the stimulus to migrate was the natural 
curiosity of people to see an ‘outside world’ 
that they had been denied access to, the 
most important driver of emigration was the 
severe economic chaos that accompanied 
the post-communist transition. The collapse 
of what had been a tightly regulated 
economy, with state control of all 
production, services and welfare, left many 
people without jobs or other forms of 
support.  By the end of the first emigration 
decade, 800,000 people had emigrated 
and stayed abroad, and this number grew to 
1.1 million by 2004 and to 1.4 million by 
2010 (Barjaba 2000; King 2005; World 
Bank 2011: 54). 
 
The lion’s share of Albanian migration has 
been to the two most adjacent EU 
countries. Greece (600,000 Albanians 
currently living there) and Italy (400,000), 
creating a compact transnational migratory 
space. Over time Albanian migrants have 
also spread, both by direct and onward 
migration, to other European countries 
(notably the UK) and to North America 
(especially via the US lottery-based diversity 
visa programme). Greece remains the 
single most important destination; 
moreover in this country Albanians have a 
dominating presence, accounting for about 
60 per cent of the immigrant population 
and having a considerable impact in a 
country of 11 million. 
 
Apart from some 30,000 initial emigrants 
who departed during 1990-91, when the 
communist government was still in power 
and who were treated by Italy and other 
European countries as refugees, most of 
the Albanian migrants who left during the 
1990s were ‘illegal’. They entered Greece 
by hiking across the mountainous border, or 
used the services of smugglers to cross the 
Adriatic Sea to Italy in high-powered 
dinghies (King 2003). These clandestine 
routes were complemented by a lively trade 
in forged visas and identity documents. 
Aside from the initial flood of emigrants in 
the early 1990s, a second peak occurred in 
1997 as a result of the collapse of a series 
of corrupt pyramid savings schemes, into 
which many returned migrants had invested 
their earnings, necessitating re-emigration.  
 
Following Italy’s example, Greece 
implemented regularisations of illegal 
immigrants in 1998, 2001, 2005 and 
2007, which helped the majority of the 
large Albanian population in Greece to 
legalise their stays, bring over family 
members, and improve both their economic 
prospects in the labour market and their 
living and housing conditions. Legalisation 
has allowed the sex ratio of Albanians in 
Greece to normalise (the vast majority of 
the early clandestine migrants were males), 
and by the 2001 Greek census 41 per cent 
of the Albanians enumerated were females. 
Most women are engaged in raising their 
children as well as working as domestic 
cleaners or in the care sector. The most 
important employment sectors for men are 
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construction and agriculture; smaller 
numbers work in factories or in small 
businesses (e.g. painters and decorators, 
plumbers) which they have set up 
themselves. Few Albanians in Greece have 
been able to capitalise on their 
qualifications and training from Albania, so 
that teachers, office workers, agronomists 
etc. have had to take low-grade jobs which 
are the only ones on offer to immigrants in 
the Greek labour market.  
 
Ecuadorian migration to the United States 
 
Like other Andean populations, 
Ecuadorians have traditionally been very 
mobile, both within the country (to the 
coastal banana plantations and to the 
Amazon oilfields) and, since the 1950s, 
abroad. The link to New York was pioneered 
by business migrants associated with the 
fruit export industry, soon joined by manual 
labourers working for the United Fruit 
Company (Pribilsky 2007). The crisis of the 
Panama hat trade (despite its name, these 
were made in Ecuador’s southern highland 
provinces) also forced small producers to 
migrate from the 1950s onwards (Kyle 
2000: 60); again the link was with New York 
because this had been the key destination 
for hat exports. Ecuadorian emigration to 
the US, and to New York in particular, has 
been more or less continuous since then, 
but accelerated during the 1990s due to 
the harsh structural adjustment measures, 
culminating in the collapse of the already 
weak Ecuadorian economy in 1998 (Jokisch 
and Pribilsky 2002:  76). The Ecuadorian 
population had to endure hyperinflation, 
plummeting real production, collapse of the 
banking system, and a lack of trust in the 
political institutions of the country; in the 
decade 1996-2007 the country had ten 
different governments. International 
migration became a way forward, 
particularly for the impoverished urban 
middle classes but also for people from 
rural areas, such as Xarbán. Even though 
the US alternative became more expensive 
and risky compared to the European 
options, Ecuadorians continued to head for 
New York since the rewards are perceived to 
be higher. Current estimates give a figure of 
half a million Ecuadorians living the US, 
most of them as irregular migrants (Gratton 
2007).  
 
Spain is the second destination for 
Ecuadorian migrants, with 400,000, 
followed by Italy, 120,000. Early Ecuadorian 
migration to Spain was made up of Otavalo 
traders from the Southern Andes. The 
Spain-Ecuador treaty of 1963 allowed 
Ecuadorians to enter as tourists without a 
visa provided they had 'proof' than they 
could financially support themselves on 
holiday. A whole money-lending business 
sprung up:  the required amount, called 
bolsa, was borrowed from chulqueros (loan-
sharks) or assembled by the family (Jokisch 
and Pribilsky 2002: 83-84). Despite Spain's 
historically continuous high unemployment 
rate, Ecuadorians found a ready niche in 
the thriving shadow economy, especially 
women who worked as domestic helpers 
and carers of elderly Spaniards (Gratton 
2007: 595). The Spanish regularisations of 
2000, 2001, and 2005 helped many 
Ecuadorians who entered as tourists and 
overstayed to become legal residents. 
Introduction of the visa requirement in 
2003, however, stifled new entrants, 
leaving family reunion as the main legal 
route into Spain. 
 
Two Corridors 
 
Within these broad national contexts, the 
field research zoomed in on a more 
localised corridor: a small rural area of 
origin in Albania and in Ecuador, and a 
metropolitan destination where most of the 
emigrants went to, Thessaloniki and New 
York respectively. 
 
The selected rural district for the research 
in Albania consisted of a cluster of three 
adjacent villages in the commune of Pojan 
in the south-east of the country (referenced 
henceforth in this paper collectively as 
Pojan). Together the villages have around 
7,000 people. The villages contain a cross-
section of population typical of southern 
Albania:  a mixture of Muslims, Orthodox 
Christians (some of whom lay claim to 
ethnic-Greek ancestry and thus qualify for 
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privileged treatment as immigrants in 
Greece), and ethnic Roma and Evgjit 
(‘gypsies’), who are dark-skinned, poor and 
marginalised. The villages lie within the 
district and prefecture of Korçë. The city of 
Korçë (population 85,000) is the most 
important regional pole for south-east 
Albania. With its administrative functions, 
food and textile industries, university, 
mosques and large Orthodox Cathedral, 
Korçë is relatively prosperous by Albanian 
standards.  
 
The villages lie at an altitude of 800 metres 
on an elevated plain which is favourable for 
farming, with fertile soils. Summers are hot 
and dry, winters usually cold and wet, with 
some snow. A mixed form of agriculture is 
practised, with livestock (pigs, cattle, sheep, 
poultry), cereals, vegetables and fruits; 
apple orchards are a local speciality. Most 
farming is semi-subsistence, however, due 
to a number of reasons: the dismantling of 
the communist-era cooperatives and the 
fragmentation of land into small holdings, 
lack of marketing and transport systems, 
and the depletion of the labour force by 
emigration.  
 
Given its position relatively close to the 
Greek border, the vast majority of 
international migration is to Greece. There 
is no breakdown at the local level of 
different emigration destinations, but a 
realistic estimate is that at least 80 per 
cent of Pojan’s emigration is to this country. 
Smaller numbers go to Italy, Macedonia, the 
US and Canada, the last two destinations 
partly through links established by pre-
communist emigration from this area. The 
villages, and the Korçë district as a whole, 
also experience strong internal out-
migration, the majority of which is to the 
capital, Tirana.  
 
Thessaloniki is the main Greek destination 
for migrants from Pojan. The second city of 
Greece, with around 1 million people in its 
metropolitan region, it is the closest major 
employment centre for the villagers, around 
four hours travel time by car, longer by bus 
and longer too if there are delays at the 
border, which there often are. Albanians in 
Thessaloniki are employed in the kinds of 
gendered job sectors mentioned above for 
Greece as a whole, with the exception of 
fewer in agriculture and a larger share in 
small, labour-intensive manufacturing 
concerns. The Albanian population is 
distributed across most parts of the city, 
mainly in poorer pockets of housing and in 
the lower floors of apartment blocks (see 
Hatziprokopiou 2006 for a detailed study). 
 
The rural field site in Ecuador was the 
Andean village of Xarbán (a pseudonym), in 
the southern province of Azuay whose 
capital, Cuenca, is an hour and a half away 
by bus. According to the 2001 census, 
Xarbán has a population of just over 2,000, 
with a female majority of 59 per cent due to 
male outmigration. Nearly all of the 
population self-identify as mestizo, i.e. of 
mixed Spanish/indigenous origin.  
 
Xarbán is located on the eastern slopes of 
the Gualaceo valley with land ranging in 
altitude from 2,500 to above 3,500 metres. 
The lowest land, where the village houses 
are located, is given over to agriculture 
(corn, potatoes, tomatoes, beans, fruit); the 
middle-range land is cattle pasture; above 
3,500 metres is bare moorland unusable 
for farming (see Weismantel 1988 for a 
study of Andean farming). The climate is 
high-altitude tropical, with frequent rain but 
also a dry season; erosion of steep slopes is 
common.  
 
Mounting population pressure on the hilly 
land has led to a splitting-up of 
landownership into progressively smaller 
holdings – to minifundios of less than 5 
hectares and microfundios of below 1 ha. 
The two large estates in the village’s lands 
were subdivided amongst its labourers long 
before the 1964 Ecuadorian land reform. 
Whilst agriculture provides the basis for 
survival, it allows no room for improvement 
in living standards or life ambitions (Carpio 
Benalcázar 1992: 46). Given the limitations 
of other options which have been more 
important in the past (gold mining along the 
valley, craft activities – mainly hats, shoes, 
knitted jumpers), migration, initially 
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internally but then internationally, became 
the favoured way to progesar, to make 
progress.  
 
Due to region’s physical geography, Andean 
peasants have always been mobile between 
different ecological niches (Buren 1996; 
Murra 2002). In Xarbán, various 
‘opportunity windows’ for internal mobility 
preceded the more recent international 
migration. From the 1950s onwards many 
male villagers migrated temporarily to work 
for state-owned companies opening up the 
Ecuadorian section of the Amazon basin; 
some settled more permanently there with 
their families to raise cattle and tropical 
crops. Around the same time, other male 
labourers moved in the opposite direction to 
work in the seasonal sugar harvest in the 
Pacific coastal strip. By the 1980s, these 
internal migrations had come to an end, to 
be replaced by international moves to the 
US.  
 
Departures from Xarbán for the US have 
been linked to key events in Ecuador and 
the US. In 1993 a landslide flooded most of 
the lowland in the Gualaceo valley:  
migration increased sharply after this 
disaster. Secondly, the dollarisation of 
Ecuador’s currency in January 2000 
created another peak of emigration due to 
the sharp devaluation of the sucre; in 
particular many returnees re-emigrated 
after seeing the value of their savings 
slashed. Meantime 9/11 and the start of 
the economic crisis in 2008 were two 
events in the US which had a dampening 
effect on emigration rates. Recession has 
had a major impact on the construction 
industry, where most male migrants work. 
The smaller number of female migrants in 
New York are involved in raising families 
and working part-time as domestic cleaners 
and babysitters. Most Xarbán migrants in 
the US are concentrated in the Queens area 
of New York City, along Roosevelt Avenue 
(‘la Rusvel’). Although virtually all of them 
are classed as ‘illegal’ migrants, access to 
employment is easy as they work for bosses 
who do not require them to have work 
permits, or they ‘rent’ fake papers.  
Nowadays remittances from New York are 
the villagers’ main income source. All other 
sources are regarded as time-consuming 
and of low benefit, since migration to the 
US yields financial returns higher than any 
other activity that the villagers have ever 
been involved with. But the initial 
‘investment’ is also very high:  the 
smuggling fees to enter the US as an 
irregular migrant were over $15,000 in 
2009 (quite apart from the human costs of 
the stressful journey, separation from family 
etc.). Migrants can only start sending 
remittances to their families in the village 
after this debt has been paid off, usually 
after one or two years.  
 
 
Methods 
 
Reflecting Marcus’ (1995) landmark paper 
on multi-sited ethnography as applied to 
studies of migrants, the main field 
investigations in the villages were 
supplemented by shorter field stays in 
Thessaloniki and New York. Both projects 
comprised two main research instruments, 
a household survey and in-depth interviews. 
The main target populations were the two 
sets of remittance-receiving households, 
but through them detailed information was 
also collected on the remittance-sending 
migrants, some of whom were interviewed 
in the destinations cities. 
 
For the Pojan-Thessaloniki migration and 
remittance corridor, 350 questionnaires 
were completed with remittance-receiving 
households in the villages, following a 
multiple-entry snowballing approach which 
was designed to cover all types of receptor 
(i.e. by age, gender, composition, ethno-
religious group etc.). The gender and 
generation breakdowns of the recipients 
and senders of remittances will be analysed 
in detail in the next section of this paper, 
but straightaway we can reveal that whilst 
the gender distribution of remittance 
receivers was relatively even (58 per cent 
female), virtually all the remitters were 
males. 
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The questionnaires were administered face-
to-face with the interviewer recording 
information onto the form. The 43 
questions in the survey were in four groups:  
household demography, housing, financial 
and in-kind remittances, and other aspects 
of the household economy. The largest 
block of questions – more than half the 
total – was on remittances and sought to 
ascertain the following data:  who the main 
remitter was (sex, age, length of time away, 
relationship to the receiver), regularity and 
frequency of remitting, value of remittances 
as share of household income, use of 
remittances, decision-making on uses, in-
kind remittances, and remittances and 
business development.  
 
The results and contacts form the 
questionnaire survey were used to 
implement the second stage of research in 
Pojan, a series of 25 in-depth interviews 
with remittance receivers and 
administrators, and some returnees. These 
interviews explored in more detail issues 
relating to gender roles, decision-making, 
changes over time and plans for the future, 
all with remittances and family dynamics as 
the core theme. A second set of the 20 
interviews were taken with remittance-
senders in Thessaloniki, again chosen 
strategically to represent a range of 
household and economic circumstances. All 
45 interviews were recorded, transcribed 
and translated. A final round of interviews 
and discussions was held with 14 key 
informants and four focus groups, 
distributed across the two research sites, 
and also in the regional capital, Korçë. 
 
The Albanian and Greek fieldwork was 
carried out during the first part of 2008, 
preceded by a reconnaissance visit in 
November 2007 to check out field sites and 
pilot the questionnaire and interview 
schedules. This scoping visit was 
straightforward since earlier migration 
research had been carried out in nearby 
villages and in Thessaloniki (see King and 
Vullnetari 2009; Vullnetari 2008; Vullnetari 
and King 2008). 
 
The Ecuadorian fieldwork started with a 
pilot visit in summer 2008, followed by four 
months in Xarbán in early 2009 and six 
weeks in New York at the end of that year. 
Naturally the precise listing and wording of 
the questions and the approach to the 
questionnaire and interview surveys were 
not identical to those used in the Albanian 
study, given the independent status of the 
two projects, but there was sufficient 
similarity to sustain viable comparisons. 
 
The Xarbán questionnaire was administered 
to 76 households, considerably fewer than 
in Pojan, but representing roughly the same 
sample fraction of the total population 
(taking all household members in account, 
both surveys ‘captured’ about 15 per cent 
of the villages’ populations). The 76 
household questionnaires contained 
information on 306 villagers and 213 
migrants, nearly all of the latter (202 or 95 
per cent) classed as ‘illegals’ in the United 
States. As with Pojan, an attempt was made 
to sample all sectors of the village, but 
statistical representativeness cannot be 
claimed. Nevertheless, for both surveys we 
are confident that good correspondence 
exists between the sample taken and the 
population of village households with 
migrants abroad. In both cases migration 
‘saturated’ village socio-economic life and 
remittances were the biggest single source 
of income.  
 
The Xarbán survey was administered face-
to-face. Blocks of questions were asked on 
household composition, migrant members, 
contacts between migrants and household 
members, remittances, and changes due to 
remittances. Concerning remittances, 
specific questions probed types of 
remittances, sending channels, frequency, 
decisions about sending and utilisation, 
and changes in the household and village 
economy and appearance due to 
remittances. As with the Pojan survey, most 
remittance receivers were females, most 
senders males, but with different 
percentages and different kinship-dyad 
patterns, as we shall see in the next 
section.   
 
 11 
Parallel to the Albanian field strategy, the 
questionnaire survey also functioned as a 
lead-in to the in-depth interviews. In Xarbán 
25 interviews were taken with non-migrants 
and returnees, and a further nine with key 
informants such as priests, teachers, health 
workers etc. It was not possible to talk to 
migrants on return visits as their illegal 
status in the US prevents them from 
returning temporarily to Ecuador. As with 
the Pojan interviews, the discussion 
focused around the themes of migration, 
remittances, and resultant social and 
economic changes, with plenty of scope left 
for other topics to be brought up. All the 
Xarbán interviews were recorded, 
transcribed and selected material (such as 
quotes) translated.  
 
This did not prove possible with the final set 
of ten interviews with Xarbán migrants in 
the very different research setting of New 
York. There it was difficult to arrange one-to-
one interviews due to the migrants working 
long hours and their intense after-work 
community life. As a result, most interviews 
were undertaken at community gatherings 
against a background of sociability and 
ambient noise. Detailed notes were taken 
after each interview in lieu of recording. 
 
 
Dyads within corridors:  power, 
gender and family dynamics 
 
The rise of academic and policy interest in 
remittances over the last decades has been 
remarkable. In an intriguing graph Carling 
(2008b: 46) shows how, whilst there was 
an approximate fivefold increase in the 
annual quantity of remittances 1980-2005, 
there was a thirty-fold increase in journal 
articles over the same period. Since the 
early 1990s, remittances have been seen in 
an increasingly positive light, especially 
significant being the landmark collection of 
papers edited by Van Hear and Nyberg 
Sorensen (2003; originally published as a 
special issue of International Migration, 
40(5), 2002). Remittances have gone from 
being one of the consequences of migration 
to a central object of study; a research topic 
by itself. 
 
Moreover, in these grand debates about the 
role of remittances in (under)development 
there is a black box that stays permanently 
untouched:  what precisely happens 
between senders and receivers?  Power, 
kinship, gender and generation all enter 
into the discussion here as relational 
variables; that is to say each is seen in 
relation to at least one other (e.g. a male 
migrant may be father to his children, the 
husband to his wife, the son to his father, a 
brother to his siblings, and so on). 
 
Following Carling (2007:17) we use the tag 
dyad to refer to the pairing of a sender and 
a receiver of remittances. This relationship 
is not purely functional for the transmission 
of money or material goods between one 
person and another but is embedded 
within, expressive of, and indeed has the 
capacity to change, personal and family 
relations. Hence power structures, which 
are highly likely to be gendered and 
generational, are implicated in this dyadic 
process. Remitters can send money or 
goods to more than one person, and a non-
migrant can receive remittances, gifts etc., 
from more than one migrant. To capture 
this complexity we use the terms ‘main 
dyad’ and ‘secondary dyad’ to distinguish 
levels of amount and consistency in 
remittance transfers. Thus, each migrant 
who sends remittances is part of a main 
dyad and may belong to none, one or 
several secondary dyads. Likewise, a 
remittance recipient has a main ‘supplier’ 
but also, potentially, one or more subsidiary 
remitters sending smaller amounts of 
money or gifts on a less regular basis. 
 
Two examples to illustrate. A married male 
migrant from Xarbán in the US whose wife 
and children remain in the village will likely 
have them as his main dyad, remitting to 
his wife, while at the same time sending 
occasional amounts of money or gifts to his 
elderly parents, who are his secondary 
dyad. Or, a second, more complicated 
example: a middle-aged couple in Pojan 
have two sons and a daughter, all living and 
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 working in Greece. The older son is married 
with his wife and young child living with 
them in Thessaloniki, the younger emigrant 
son is single. The daughter is married and 
also has her nuclear family, including her 
husband, abroad. The middle-aged couple’s 
main dyad is with their younger, unmarried 
son. The older son has his co-resident 
family as his main financial and moral 
responsibility, so he sends only small 
amounts, maybe for special occasions or in 
emergencies, to his parents. The daughter, 
according to Albanian patriarchal custom, 
‘belongs’ to the family of her husband and 
so is not ‘allowed’ to send remittances to 
her parents, although she may, openly or 
secretly, send small token ‘gifts’ to them 
(see Smith 2009). We explore some of 
these arrangements in more detail 
presently.  
 
Much the same distinction as that between 
main and secondary dyads applies to the 
migration and remittance corridors within 
which the remittance dyads are strung out. 
The Albania-Greece corridor is a 
symmetrical main corridor in that Greece is 
the main migrant destination for Albanians, 
and Albanians are the main migrant group 
in Greece: the figures were given earlier. 
The Ecuador-US case is asymmetrical: the 
US is the single largest destination for 
Ecuadorian migrants (although Spain and 
Italy run close), but Ecuador is a relatively 
minor immigrant source for the US, well 
behind Mexico and several other countries. 
Nevertheless within the corridors there are 
chain-migration filaments which tie 
individual ‘hometown’ sources and 
destinations tightly together, such as 
Xarbán-Queens and Pojan-Thessaloniki. 
This brings us back to an examination of 
the main remittance transfers.  
 
We start with brief background data on 
amounts, frequency and means of transfer. 
Tables 2 and 3 set out the household 
survey results for the first two of these 
variables. For remittance amounts, strict 
comparability of the survey data is 
inevitably compromised by the different 
currencies. However, the mean amount 
remitted per year, €2600 for Pojan and 
$3430 for Xarbán, are remarkably similar 
given the greater value of the euro. The 
distribution of amounts varies, however, 
with Albanian remittances more closely 
bunched in and around the modal class of 
1000-2000. For Xarbán, a greater share of 
households receives either the lowest or 
the largest amounts in the table. These 
differences mainly reflect the limitations of 
the labour market for immigrants in Greece, 
where wages for immigrants are low, 
although still much higher than in Albania; 
in contrast to the greater earnings 
possibilities (but not for all immigrants) in 
the New York economy.  
Table 2   Pojan and Xarbán: households' annual remittances 
  Pojan (euros)   Xarbán US dollars)  
  no. %  no. %  
< 1000 66 19  23 30  
1-2000 139 40  8 11  
2-4000 76 22  23 30  
4-6000 44 13  10 13  
> 6000 25 7  12 16  
n households 350     76     
Source: Authors’ surveys      
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Table 3 shows that remitting frequency is 
much higher in Xarbán, where 60 per cent 
of remittances are sent weekly, fortnightly 
or monthly, compared to only 9 per cent in 
Pojan. This contrast is related to the third 
variable, means of transfer. Most 
remittances to Xarbán are sent via money 
transfer operators (MTOs) or other formal 
channels, whereas Albanians’ mistrust of 
the banking sector and their inability to 
access it in many cases, combined with 
geographical closeness means that the vast 
majority of remittances are ‘hand-carried’ 
when migrants return irregularly on visits, or 
sent via relatives and trusted co-villagers. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 set out the main remittance 
dyads, for Xarbán and Pojan respectively. 
The listing of the dyads is in their order of 
frequency in the survey and interview data, 
including key informants. Gender and 
generation are the main structuring 
variables for these dyads, but issues of 
power, particularly patriarchal power, are 
the real ‘drivers’ of the relations crystallised 
in most of these dyadic links. Both 
societies, the Ecuadorian and the Albanian, 
can be regarded as fundamentally 
patriarchal. In as far as cross-cultural 
comparisons are possible, we perceive that  
 
Albanian rural society is more deeply 
structured along patriarchal lines than the 
Ecuadorian. Ecuadorian village society 
reflects the kind of patriarchal (and 
matriarchal) values sanctioned by the 
Catholic Church, into fairly traditional 
gender roles but with women retaining 
some agency within the maternal, caring, 
wifely functions and engaging in farm 
labour as childrearing and other 
responsibilities allow. The nuclear family 
predominates.  
 
Albanian rural society conforms to many of 
these same gendered values but there are 
some essential differences. Religion, 
outlawed by the communist regime of Enver 
Hoxha, obviously plays a minor role 
although in the post-communist era it is not 
entirely absent. What distinguishes the 
Albanian case is the more hierarchically 
ordered gender and generational 
structures, in particular the ‘ownership’ of 
the daughter by her father (or, in his 
absence, by other male relatives, notably 
brothers), and the way in which this 
‘possession’ is passed to her husband and 
his paternal family upon marriage. 
Particularly in the north of Albania (less so 
in the south where this survey was carried  
Table 3   Pojan and Xarbán: remitting frequencies by number of households 
  Pojan (euros)   Xarbán (US dollars)   
 no. %  no. %  
Weekly or fortnightly 3 1  25 16  
Monthly 27 8  69 44  
Every 2 months 31 9  1 1  
Every 3-6 months 194 55  43 27  
Once a year 58 17  7 4  
Irregular/one-off /as needed 37 10  13 8  
n respondents/migrants 350      158     
Source: Authors’ surveys       
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Table 5   Main remittance dyads: most common patterns, Xarbán 
Sender (New York)    Receiver (Xarbán)   
 
Married male migrant 
alone abroad 
 
  
 
Wife (and children) 
 
Married couple abroad 
  
 
Maternal female relatives 
(caring for migrants' children) 
 
Married couple abroad 
  
 
Children (if old enough)  
Single Male 
  
Parents (father)  
           
Source: Authors' survey     
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5   Main remittance dyads: most common patterns, Pojan 
Sender (Thessaloniki)       Receiver (Pojan)   
       
Married male migrant 
alone abroad 
  
Wife (and children)  
Single male 
  
Parents (father)  
Married male migrant 
alone abroad 
  
Extended family (father)  
Married couple abroad 
  
Husband's parents 
(father) 
 
            
Source: Authors' survey     
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out), the multi-generation family, almost a 
clan, is more important, with the oldest 
male as the patriarch over the extended 
household. When emigrants originate from 
the north – as in a previous study of 
remittances sent by Albanian migrants in 
London to their families back home (King et 
al. 2006) – these ‘traditional’ gendered and 
patriarchally controlled patterns are found 
to be replicated more or less throughout the 
migration and remittance cycle. Our data 
from southern Albania show some 
departures from this patriarchal framework, 
as we shall see.  
 
Remittance dyads also expose, to varying 
extents, the fallacy of the household or 
family as a harmonious unit with shared 
collective interests: the assumption implicit 
in much writing about remittances, 
including the pioneering studies of the New 
Economics of Labour Migration approach 
(Lucas and Stark 1985; Stark and Lucas 
1988; Taylor 1999). Rather, as other 
studies have shown (e.g. Cligget 2005; de 
Haas and Fokkema 2010), dyadic relations 
are not problem-free. Some further 
examples of these tensions will become 
apparent as we look now at each dyad in 
turn. We start with Xarbán as the patterns 
here are somewhat more straightforward.   
 
Xarbán and New York 
 
For both Xarbán and Pojan, emigration 
initially consisted overwhelmingly of males. 
This has remained the case over time with 
Xarbán, due to the continued ‘illegal’ status 
of the migrants in the US, thus making 
family reunion and settlement there 
difficult. This, rather than patriarchal 
principles per se, has determined that 
remittance-senders are mainly males, and 
usually living abroad as single men, 
whether married or not. We say this 
because other Ecuadorian migration chains 
to Spain and Italy have been female-led and 
females are the main remitters (Boccagni 
2009: 167-206). For Xarbán the two 
dominant dyads, by some measure, are 
males who live alone remitting to their 
parents (if they are single) or to their wives 
(if they are married). Such remittances are 
sufficient to ensure a reasonably 
comfortable survival. As 51-year-old RQ, the 
wife of a migrant and with three migrant 
sons in the US, simply put it:  ‘Here you can 
live on money from the US’. Thanks to 
remittances, levels of comfort in the village 
have dramatically increased, even if this is 
partly the consequence of a very low initial 
standard of living. This increase in material 
well-being is not without a negative side. 
Loneliness and physical separation are 
often mentioned as a drawback by 
remittance receivers:   
 
Sometimes I miss them [her children 
abroad]. I did not want them to 
emigrate. But they told me, ‘We can’t 
just stay here with you, starving’. Now I 
buy 50 cents of bananas and they go 
bad, there is no one to eat them. I wish 
they would eat them. When people are 
alone, this is bad. Sometimes you have 
to be hard-hearted (GD, 48, widow with 
four migrant children in the US). 
 
A key switch in dyads occurs when migrants 
marry. They become ‘obliged’ towards their 
spouse (ser de obligación meaning to be 
married), and the migrant’s parental 
household ceases being the main 
household of reference, though it can still 
continue as a secondary dyad if the 
migrant’s income allows this. Where there 
are several migrants from the same family, 
the financial burden of sending remittances 
is shared, which lightens individual 
responsibility. In the case of parents who 
have both migrant and non-migrant 
children, the former are responsible for 
providing financial and material support via 
remittances, whilst the latter perform the 
actual physical care of the older generation. 
Obviously this division of financial 
responsibility and emotional caring 
depends on a certain level of harmony and 
agreement between the siblings. As 
Pribilsky (2004) found in his research in 
another part of highland Ecuador, those 
families who learn to convivir (to live side-
by-side) and have better relationships are 
more likely to succeed economically and 
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socially.  
 
For married migrants, the majority of whom 
have their spouses in Xarbán, remittances 
are to the wives, irrespective of whether 
there are children yet in the marriage.  
However, all respondents (remittance 
senders and receivers alike) agree that the 
obligation to send remittances becomes 
stronger once children are born, and 
especially if there is at least one son.  
 
Once I had kids my life improved. 
Before he sent $20 a month to me. He 
didn’t care whether I had any shoes on 
my feet or not. Now he sends $400 a 
month. Because of the children, he 
must send [money to support them] 
(BC, 30, wife of migrant with two 
daughters and one son). 
  
When married migrants are still childless, 
the left-behind wife feels more vulnerable 
and the possibility of remittances drying up 
is always present:  
 
If the money ever stops arriving and I 
am used to living a comfortable life, 
that’s bad. Suddenly something goes 
wrong with my husband…and, used to 
the high life, then I am fucked [sic] (GC, 
45, wife of migrant in US, no children). 
 
Even for those with children, a life 
dependent on remittances can be 
precarious:  migrant husbands may suffer 
periods of unemployment or they may 
become involved with someone else whilst 
abroad. In most cases, however, the 
transnational relationship is sufficiently 
solid and pragmatic (Pribilsky 2004), and 
there is no need for non-migrant wives to 
‘ask’ for remittances:   
 
He must send because of the children. 
He knows he has to send $300 every 
month, and the school also means a lot 
of money. There is no need to be 
asking (RJ, 32, wife with two teenage 
children, husband in US). 
 
 
Another form of dyad which occurs in 
Xarbán is migrant couples living abroad 
sending money to their children. The latter 
live on their own if they are old enough, or 
with a relative if not. Usually this relative is 
their maternal grandmother but other 
arrangements are also possible, such as an 
aunt (usually the sister of their mother). 
Note how, here, the maternal kinship 
patterns are the dominant ones, in contrast 
to Albania where patrilinearity prevails. 
Also, in Albania it is rare to find the parent-
offspring remittance dyad, as we shall see. 
 
Yet another, albeit less common, 
remittance dyad in Xarbán is the sibling 
link. Brothers send remittances for the daily 
expenses and education of their siblings 
living in the parental home in the village. 
Julca (2005: 16) has acknowledged the 
importance of these ‘fraternal’ remittances 
among Peruvian migrants in New York City. 
This kind of support to siblings may go well 
beyond the ‘drip-feeding’ sending of 
remittances.  For instance, older brothers 
abroad can facilitate younger siblings’ 
migratory project by sending or lending 
them money for the journey; and they may 
then support them after arrival by 
welcoming them and using their network of 
contacts and information to find them a 
job.  
 
On the whole, Xarbán’s remittance dyads 
tend not to challenge traditional gender 
roles, as men are still cast in the 
breadwinner role, albeit from afar, and 
women stay at home taking care of the 
children. Some disruption, however, results 
in generational relations. Where migrants 
remit to support their parents, a kind of role 
inversion occurs:  parents who are 
traditionally portrayed as their children’s 
providers, become remittance receivers 
and as such dependant on their children. 
As one father remarked: ‘How can I 
complain [about my children] if we live on 
them! Before we were the parents, now 
they are our parents’. For younger non-
migrants living off the remittances of their  
parents, other emotions arise: 
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DMC: Is your life better since your 
parents went to the US? 
 
I am not sure. Yes, my life is better, but 
I do not have my parents’ affection now 
(ML, female, 16, living the village with 
her three brothers, both parents in the 
US). 
 
The case of Xarbán should not be 
generalised too widely, however. Ongoing 
research by one of the authors in another 
Ecuadoran highland community where 
emigration has been mainly of female 
workers to Spain shows much more 
fundamental gender-role adjustments  
(Mata-Codesal 2011). Research by Bastia 
and Busse (2011) on international 
migration from Bolivia and Peru shows a 
variety of gendered effects. Women’s 
autonomous migration in the case of 
Bolivians moving to Argentina shows 
‘gender gains’ to be short-lived. Those who 
migrate to Spain achieve greater 
individuality and independence but 
patriarchal relations are reconstituted when 
return migration takes place. Peruvian 
migration to the US replicates the 
Ecuadorian model, being led by men with 
women left behind to fulfil childbearing, 
household and caring roles. 
 
Pojan and Thessaloniki 
 
Table 5 displays the four main migration 
dyads affecting transmigrant households in 
Pojan. Unsurprisingly, there is some 
similarity with the dyads presented for 
Xarbán. The crucial difference is that 
Albanian migration has evolved from a 
stage (mainly in the 1990s) when it was 
made up of undocumented males working 
in Greece in the informal labour market to 
one (mainly in 2000s) where most migrants 
are legally present (albeit dependent on 
time-limited residence and work permits) 
and able to bring over their families or start 
married life in Greece.  
 
Despite this general trend towards family-
based migration, the most common dyad is 
between the migrant husband and recipient 
wife. As in Xarbán, the wife usually has 
children to look after. There are two main 
variants of this dyad, according to whether 
the husband is in Greece all year round or 
as a seasonal worker. In the first subtype, 
the husband probably has legal residence 
in Greece and, as a result, a reasonably 
stable job, although this may be 
jeopardised in the current financial crisis. 
Return visits, made easy by the 
geographical proximity of Pojan to the 
border, are likely to be fairly frequent – for 
holidays (one or more, at New Year, Easter 
and summer) and family occasions such as 
weddings. 
 
Remittances under this kind of migration 
are amongst the highest in the survey. The 
husband-wife dyad averages €3152 per 
year, compared to €2596 for the whole 
sample. The former figure would be even 
higher were it not lowered by the second 
variant, which occurs when the migrant is a 
seasonal worker in Greece. Here the 
working period is obviously shorter and the 
wages for this kind of work (usually in 
agriculture) are lower than for urban jobs. 
Seasonal migrants, who either have six-
month work permits or are irregular 
migrants, therefore remit significantly less 
than long-term migrants, a typical figure 
being €1500 over the season. In the 
following quote Monda, a 45-year-old wife 
of a seasonal migrant, describes the 
precarious nature of her husband’s 
employment in Greece:  first he goes to do 
harvest work and then, for the remainder of 
the six-month visa, he looks for other work. 
 
He works in the peach orchards… near 
Veria [to the east of Thessaloniki]… 
Then, when that finishes, he goes 
elsewhere and does welding jobs, 
whatever he can find, all sorts of work. 
His work is not guaranteed, so he takes 
whatever comes up. 
 
The two subtypes of the husband-wife dyad 
have other differences too. Usually the 
household dependent on the long-term 
migrant is totally or almost entirely 
dependent on remittances; the wife is fully 
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committed to family and household duties, 
though she may work in the garden plot 
surrounding the house, cultivating 
vegetables and perhaps keeping chickens. 
With her husband away most of the year, 
she becomes de facto the household head, 
which is usually seen as an extra burden 
rather than a source of empowerment. For 
the seasonal-migrant arrangement, the 
migrant male retains more of the head-of-
household role, and may often integrate 
seasonal work abroad with farming at home 
– implicating his wife, too, in a greater 
share of farming tasks such as work in the 
fields and with livestock. Both subtypes 
may be accompanied by secondary dyads 
from the migrant to his (hardly ever his 
wife’s) parents, if there is sufficient income 
and especially in response to emergencies. 
 
A third variant, more of a hybrid type of 
dyad, occurs when the recipient wife also 
has to care for other family members in 
addition to her children. Usually these are 
her husband’s parents (not her own 
parents, who are the ‘responsibility’ of her 
brothers and their wives). This arrangement 
reflects the fact that she ‘belongs’ and has 
‘duties’ to her husband’s family. These care 
duties are often the precise reason why she 
cannot join her husband abroad. If the 
elderly parents-in-law are incapable of 
looking after themselves, then the wife is 
the remittance receiver. However if she 
lives with them and the father-in-law is 
compos mentis, then he becomes the 
remittance receiver from his son:  the third 
type in Table 5. This next quote describes a 
composite recipient household situation 
whereby Elda (aged 34), the migrant’s wife, 
receives remittances from her husband and 
uses them to support both their own three 
children and her husband’s elderly parents: 
 
My husband brings the money with him 
when he comes to visit…in April, in 
August and for the New Year…three 
times a year… There is no fixed 
amount, it depends on how his work is 
going… Myself and my mother-in-law, 
us women manage it. 
 
In this instance, managing the remittances 
is in the hands of the two women as the 
father-in-law, in his 80s, is too ill.  
 
This leads to the next most common 
Albanian dyad: son to father (the second 
type in Table 5). When the son is single, this 
will be the main dyad. Remittances from 
single young male migrants can be quite 
substantial, especially if they are bound to 
their parents by a strong moral of ‘duty’, 
and bearing in mind they do not have their 
own nuclear family to support. The money 
is remitted to the father unless he has died 
or become very ill, in which case the 
widow/mother is the recipient. If the 
parental household has two or more single 
sons working abroad, then it is on the 
receiving end of multiple main dyads, and 
may easily accumulate capital well beyond 
the survival needs of the household. Such 
‘excess’ capital, regarded as savings rather 
than remittances, is often directed towards 
the purchase of a building plot, the 
construction of dwellings, some other 
business opportunity, or geared towards 
the future marriage of the single sons. 
Where the son is married, as already noted, 
the main remittance dyad will be to his wife 
or to his father as the ‘guardian’ of his wife 
in an extended family household; otherwise 
remittances to his father will be a 
secondary dyad.   
 
The fourth dyad in Table 5 concerns 
remittances from married couples abroad. 
Significant remittances are not usually 
expected from migrants living abroad as 
nuclear families since it is understood that 
their principal financial commitments are to 
supporting themselves and their children. 
The main remittance dyad will be to the 
husband’s parents, who may need support 
in their old age, in which case the 
remittances are viewed, and indeed 
labelled, as a kind of ‘pension’. Within this 
remittance channel, the precise dyad is son 
to father, or to the mother if she is a widow 
or the father is very ill. These remittances 
are enhanced in their quantity and 
regularity if the older generation is looking 
after the migrants’ children – an 
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arrangement which allows both migrant 
parents to work full-time in Greece. Another 
means of solving the childcare issue is for 
the older generation to follow their children 
to Greece, where they (and especially the 
grandmother) can take care of the children 
and household duties there (King and 
Vullnetari 2006).  
 
Thus far we have described and exemplified 
the four main dyads, all sent by males, 
either to fathers, or to wives if the migrant 
is married and has migrated alone. Less 
common male-sending dyads – just a 
handful of cases in the survey – were 
brother to brother and father/parents to 
children. The latter arrangement, more 
common in Xarbán, occurred in Pojan only 
with a few Evgjit families where the parents 
went as seasonal agricultural workers to 
Greece, and sent regular remittances to 
their children. The older teenage child 
would be left in charge of younger siblings, 
perhaps supported by the watchful eye of a 
neighbour or relative.  
 
Given that, in Pojan, more so than in 
Xarbán, women have become increasingly 
involved in the migration process (but 
almost never as ‘independent’ migrants), to 
what extent have they also become active 
as remitters? The traditional Albanian 
family model excludes this since women 
are regarded as the ‘property’ of men (their 
fathers or husbands) and all financial 
matters are directed by males even if, 
within the household, the woman ‘holds the 
purse-strings’, i.e. administers  the 
household expenditure on food, clothing 
etc. Whereas prior research in northern 
Albania revealed the persistence of the 
patriarchal migration and remittance model 
(King et al. 2006), the survey data from 
Pojan and interviews in Thessaloniki found 
that women are not excluded from the 
remittance process (see also Smith 2009, 
who did research in another part of 
southern Albania). Interestingly, 
remittances sent along the female line 
(usually daughter to mother, sometimes to 
a sister) are not denoted as remittances 
but as ‘presents’ or as small amounts of 
money sent ‘just for a coffee’– phrases 
which are clearly chosen to emphasise their 
secondary, informal and unofficial nature.  
 
A rather typical case is Irena, 37, living in 
Thessaloniki with her husband and young 
son. She gave the following account of the 
practice of remitting to her parents: 
 
I don’t send them money like a pension 
[i.e. regularly], but whenever some 
relative would go there, I would send 
€100 or € 200 as a dhoro [Greek for 
‘gift’] …once a month, every two 
months, as and when we found 
relatives who travelled. If they travelled 
frequently, we sent them less; if some 
time had passed, we would send them 
more… Besides money we would buy 
them clothes, we take them food when 
we visit… 
 
Irena went on to explain that they used to 
remit to her husband’s parents, but they 
have died. Regarding her own family, she 
has a married sister living in Greece who 
has been there longer and is more 
established: with a more lucrative job and 
older children who are at school all day, this 
sister sends larger amounts. 
 
This case makes us realise how individual 
dyads, main and secondary, can often only 
be understood when set within the wider 
kinship context. Moreover, for Albania, the 
multiple emigration channels, not only to 
Greece but to several other destination 
countries, even within the same family, 
complicate the analysis. Here is one final 
case (actually a double case of two 
brothers) from the Thessaloniki fieldwork 
where the wider kinship and migration 
networks are taken into consideration. The 
first speaker is Berti (47) who has been 
living in Thessaloniki with his wife and 
children since 1998. Both Berti and his 
wife have widowed mothers back in the 
village.  
 
Like I send money to my mother, so she 
sends money to hers…there is no 
difference, because she works as I 
 20 
work. There is no reason why things 
should be different – why should we 
send only to the parents of the  
 
husband? […] We send the money as a 
kind of pension, every two or three 
months, whenever we can find [trusted] 
people who travel [to the village] to 
send the money with… 
 
However the broader context here is that 
Berti’s wife comes from a daughters-only 
family, so the financial care responsibility 
has shifted in this case to the only son-in-
law (the other daughter, unmarried, stays in 
the village to look after her mother). Further 
complexity is introduced by Urim (51), 
Berti’s older brother, who also lives in 
Thessaloniki with his wife and children. 
Urim’s wife also remits to her mother, but 
not as much as they send to his mother. 
Why? ‘Well’, he said, ‘She [his mother-in-
law] has her own sons, and they might get 
upset if I remit too much as a son-in-law’. 
They would lose face because their 
traditional function of taking care of their 
mother would be compromised by a too-
active contribution from someone ‘outside’ 
the family. But when he speaks of his own 
mother, Urim relates how she receives 
support from all her four children: her two 
sons in Thessaloniki, a younger son in the 
village (who fulfils the traditional role of the 
youngest son to ‘stay with’ the parents in 
their old age), and a married daughter in 
the USA. 
 
We give her about €100-150, or 
sometimes €200, every three or four 
months… We send according to our 
abilities, everybody has their own 
financial situation… Our sister in 
America may send more, and rightly so, 
there is more money over there. 
 
 
Towards a better typology of 
remittances 
  
The previous section on remittance dyads 
has already given some clues into how 
remittances might be classified. We take 
this task – of arriving at a better, more 
detailed and realistic typology – further in 
this section, drawing on evidence from our 
two case-studies, and paying particular 
attention to the purpose and utilisation of 
remittances. 
 
We use the term ‘remittances’ initially in a 
broad sense – to mean the money, ‘stuff’ 
and ideas sent and received between 
migrants and their relatives in their places 
of origin. Material remittances comprise 
money and goods; social remittances, 
following Levitt, refer to the ideational 
changes taking place, more specifically ‘the 
ideas, behaviour, identities and social 
capital that flow from receiving to sending-
country communities’ (1998:926). In her 
landmark article, Levitt was clearly 
concerned with issues of cultural diffusion 
within a globalisation framework and put 
the overwhelming emphasis on the 
prevalence of destination-country values 
which were conveyed to the migrants’ place 
of origin by return visits and other transfer 
channels. More recently Levitt has revisited 
her social remittances concept and has 
introduced into the conceptualisation the 
effects that migrants’ original frames of 
mind have on the evolution of social 
remittances, as well as their different 
patterns of interaction with the host society 
(Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011).  Non-
migrants, too, are given a more active role 
in the transnational sphere of social 
remittances. A somewhat parallel debate 
has gone on in the field of financial and 
material remittances whereby ‘reverse 
remittances’ are realised as being 
important in the global map of remittance 
transfers (Mazzucato 2009). 
 
Our framework in what follows is to classify 
remittances and their usage under the 
following headings. First, we draw a 
distinction between three broad types:  
financial remittances, in-kind material 
remittances, and social remittances. 
Second, we distinguish between individual 
or family-level remittances, sent via one or 
more of the dyads described above, and 
collective remittances, sent for some 
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‘common good’ or ‘hometown’ project. 
Third, we focus explicitly on the use-
destinations of mainly financial 
remittances:  ‘drip-feeding’ or ‘survival’ 
remittances, debt repayment, emergency 
money, savings, gifts and collective 
remittances. Finally, for social remittances, 
we focus on the gender-relations 
dimensions, since this is one of our key 
analytical dimensions in the paper. Rather 
than deal with each community in turn, 
here we mix and compare evidence from 
Xarbán and Pojan under each remittance 
heading. 
 
Emic remittances: ‘drip-feeding’ 
 
Our use of the term ‘emic’ remittances 
privileges what the receivers themselves 
identify as remittances. In general Xarbán 
villagers understand remittances (remesas) 
as the small amounts of money sent to 
them periodically by their close relatives 
abroad, and which are used to pay for the 
food, utilities and everyday expenses in 
running a household.  They include 
children’s education costs and recurrent 
small medical expenses in their definition, 
but not unexpected and high medical bills. 
These ‘survival’ or ‘drip-feeding’ 
remittances, sent regularly every month or 
so, are often referred to by food analogies – 
‘so that we can eat’ or ‘no mas para la 
comidita’ (only for food). 
 
In Albania too there is a distinction to be 
drawn between the technical interpretation 
of remittances (by economists, 
development planners etc.) and the general 
view of the migrants and their relatives who 
tend to see remittances as ‘wages’ (if sent 
to family members of working age) or 
‘pensions’ (if sent to support elderly 
relatives). Again the implication is that this 
is for day-to-day support rather than 
investment in larger projects such as a 
business or a house. In the words of Elona 
(20) who receives money from her husband 
in Greece: 
 
I try to use the money wisely:  for food, 
to buy clothes for the children, to pay 
for their school items because they 
need things like notebooks, pens etc. 
 
The following extract from a Pojan dual 
interview with Marika (68) and her 
daughter Kristina (42) is about the 
remittances sent by Marika’s son who lives 
with his wife and family in Greece.  The son 
works in a furniture factory and his wife 
cleans houses; both earn around €40 per 
day. The dialogue draws the difference 
between ‘survival’ remittances sent to the 
two of them on a regular basis for their own 
use, and larger amounts of money brought 
back by the son and used to fund the new 
house being built in the village: 
 
Marika: He sends us money via a 
relative of his wife, who travels 
frequently by car…he never pays them, 
because they are relatives… of course 
they are trusted people. 
 
Kristina: He sends us between €50 and 
€100 every two or three months.  
 
Marika: He doesn’t leave us without: 
‘so that you may not be in need’, he 
says. We don’t need more than that, we 
try to get by on that [plus Marika’s 
monthly state pension, €45]. At the end 
of the month, or after two or three 
months, they come here, see our 
situation and leave us what we need, 
just to feed ourselves. What else do we 
need? 
 
Kristina: What goes into the [newly-
built] house, he brings with him when 
they visit: they manage that money 
themselves. 
 
The circularity in the definition of emic 
remittances creates a tension that has 
policy implications. When policy-makers 
complain about the overwhelming share of 
remittances spent on daily expenses (e.g. 
Bendixon 2003; Durant et al. 1996; 
Ellerman 2003), they are overlooking the 
fact that (emic) remittances are precisely 
those which are sent for everyday support, 
by definition. They do have developmental 
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implications (better food and health, 
maintaining children in education etc.), but 
not of the kind that economic planners 
have in mind (investment in new 
businesses, intensification of farming etc.). 
 
Debt repayment 
 
This type of transfer is not intended for 
receivers’ physical sustenance and is not 
considered by Xarbán residents emically as 
remittances; the story is a little different in 
Pojan. 
 
Debts in Xarbán are incurred by the cost of 
the migration journey – an average of 
around $15,000 in 2009, paid to money 
lenders (chulqueros) and to smugglers 
(coyoteros or pasadores). Loan-shark 
money lenders are mostly based in the 
canton capital and are (former) landowners 
who have further enriched themselves 
through lending and usury, taking over the 
borrowers’ property if they defaulted on 
their repayments. Repaying the debt takes 
between one and two years hard work, 
scrimping and saving.  A common phrase 
amongst migrants and villagers is that ‘the 
journey eats all our money’ in those first 
years. Relatives are constantly worried that 
the failure of migrants to meet their debt 
repayments will lead to the loss of 
warranted property.  Meanwhile the migrant 
is ‘trapped’ abroad and, whatever feelings 
of homesickness he may have, cannot even 
think about returning. Then, when the debt 
is paid off, there is the danger that they 
become used to life abroad and may not 
want to return. 
 
Many villagers, once they have finally 
arrived in la Yoni (New York), regret 
having gone – they want to come back 
right away. But because of the debt, 
they can’t. Once they have finished with 
the debt, they are already used to life 
there, and don’t want to return (SL, 
female, 56, husband and many other 
relatives in the US). 
 
The day the ‘journey debt’ is repaid is a 
cause of relief and rejoicing for the migrant 
and his relatives. From that day on, 
migrants will be able to save money and 
live more comfortable lives. They may 
celebrate the paying off of the debt by 
buying a present, such as a TV set or some 
other electrical appliance, for their main 
dyad partner – spouse, parents, children. 
Often, however, the savings that are then 
made are ploughed into funding or 
guaranteeing the journeys of younger 
relatives, and so the cycle continues.  
 
In Pojan debt repayment was less 
important, since the financial costs of 
migrating to Greece are low.  Nevertheless, 
just over one quarter of the survey 
respondents reported that they had either 
paid off or were paying off migration-related 
or non-migratory debt. These were mainly 
very poor households who have to borrow 
money to cover their daily living expenses:  
they either borrow informally from relatives 
or friends, or buy on credit from local 
shops, where they are ‘me listë’, on ‘the 
list’ or ‘on the slate’. Roma and Evgjit 
respondents are over-represented in the 
debt-payers, reflecting their marginalised 
socio-economic position in the villages. 
They were also amongst those who had 
incurred debts to be smuggled into Greece 
(Roma women also make these trips, as 
well as men, to work in seasonal 
harvesting) or for transport back and forth. 
Some of the debt was to service loans 
taken from banks to start or expand small 
farming businesses; these were generally 
by non-Roma/Evgjit families. 
 
Emergency remittances 
 
This form of transfer is made up of money 
sent by migrants to the families in the 
villages as one-off payments for unforeseen 
events. The most common are medical 
emergencies which are relatively high in 
cost (such as hospitalisation), and beyond 
the regular purchase of small-scale medical 
supplies such as pills, which are seen as 
part of ‘normal’ remittance use. The 
amount of money sent is of course directly 
related to the nature and seriousness of 
the emergency itself (e.g. cost of the 
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surgery) and the ability of the migrant(s) to 
gather the money in a short space of time. 
They can either draw on their own savings if 
they have any abroad, or borrow from within 
their social networks.  Given the urgency 
the money is often wired by MTO, usually 
Western Union (for both corridors): a 
relatively high fee is paid for this service, in 
return for speed (a few minutes) and 
reliability. 
 
Within main dyads, emergency money is 
not expected to be repaid (it is like emic 
remittances in this respect). This is the 
case, for example when migrant children 
send money to their parents for emergency 
medical treatment. However, when asking 
for money via a secondary dyad (e.g. 
married siblings to another married sibling, 
or through an ‘in-law’ relationship), the 
money is usually provided on the 
understanding that it is a loan, to be repaid 
at some future date, not necessarily 
specified. 
 
Theoretically, emergency remittances are 
part of the NELM framework whereby 
migration is a strategy for reducing risk and 
vulnerability, since it provides a resource to 
draw on to cushion ‘negative shocks’ (de 
Haan 1999; Stark and Lucas 1988; Taylor 
1999). Elderly relatives, in particular, are 
grateful for this ‘insurance’, even if there is 
a sense of irony in that they have to endure 
their relatives’ long-term absence from the 
village neighbourhood. 
 
With our delicate health, it is very hard 
because they [the children] are not 
physically here with us. But imagine, if 
they were here, there is no way they 
could get the money (MX, Xarbán, 70, 
female, all children in the US). 
 
In Pojan the situation regarding 
remittances for unforeseen medical 
expenses is very similar to Xarbán. Pojan 
and Thessaloniki interviewees also talked 
about the importance of having a reserve of 
money, earned through migration, for 
important life-cycle events, such as 
weddings and funerals. The latter often 
occur unexpectedly and so require short-
notice cash; weddings are likely to be 
planned some time in advance. Compared 
to earlier surveys of remittance uses in 
Albania which have shown a concern 
mainly to support day-to-day expenses and 
improving the housing environment (De 
Zwager et al. 2005; King et al. 1996; Kule 
et al. 2002), the Pojan study revealed a 
high response rate for expenditure on life-
stage events – 82 per cent of questionnaire 
respondents cited this category of 
expenditure, second only to ‘current 
household expenditures’, 95 per cent.  
 
Savings and investment remittances 
 
The existing literature on remittances often 
fails to expose the problematic relationship 
between remittances and savings. In one 
sense – when savings are kept by migrants 
in their host societies – they are clearly not 
remittances, although they might 
subsequently be seen as such when 
brought or sent home in a lump sum, 
perhaps when the migrant returns. In 
another sense, when accumulated income 
is sent or brought home periodically to be 
banked or invested in the origin country, 
the similarity with remittances is greater.  
 
Informants in the villages tend not to talk 
about migrants’ savings because they do 
not consider it as their money, except when 
they are managing it on behalf of the 
migrants. This happens mainly with the 
parents of single migrants (who have a high 
capacity to save) since fathers are usually 
the ones who administer things like 
building projects on behalf of their sons. In 
Albania this may be a multi-unit dwelling – 
a small block of flats or a large villa – with 
different floors for each member of the 
family (parents, married sons with their 
wives, etc.). 
 
From a developmental point of view, what 
happens to migrants’ savings is important 
given (what is perceived as) the limited 
development potential of ‘drip-feeding’ 
remittances. Goldring’s (2004) threefold 
classification of family (i.e. drip-feeding), 
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collective and investment remittances is a 
step forward, but this is not detailed 
enough to research the wide spectrum of 
money transfers made by migrants. A 
useful refinement of the third of Goldring’s 
types is to divide them into passive 
investments (in banks, or buying land or 
property as ‘possessions’); and active 
investments which are more business-
oriented.  This is an imprecise distinction in 
that some apparently passive investments, 
for instance building a new property, have 
clear and potentially beneficial effects on 
the local economy (demand for materials, 
hiring of building labour etc.). Land may be 
for pure speculation or status purposes, or 
it may be rented out yielding an income, or 
it may be used to develop farming. 
 
Both in Xarbán and Pojan (and more widely 
in Ecuador and Albania), most migration is 
targeted (beyond immediate survival) at 
building one’s own house, either in the 
village or in a larger settlement where 
future employment opportunities are likely 
to be better for when the migrants return.  
In Xarbán the alternatives are the local 
provincial capitals of Gualaceo and Cuenca; 
in Albania they are the regional capital 
Korçë and the national capital Tirana. In 
Albania a lot of international migration 
activity seems destined to finance an 
internal relocation from peripheral parts of 
the country (the migrants’ villages of origin) 
to Tirana which has expanded massively 
under the impetus of internal migration 
since the early 1990s (King 2004; 
Vullnetari 2008). 
 
Once a ‘proper’ house has been achieved, 
either through improving an existing 
dwelling or building a new one, savings may 
be redirected to creating a business 
opportunity, especially if the migrant plans 
to return. In Xarbán, migrants and 
returnees opt for setting up small shops, 
but these yield very low profits; male 
returnees might buy a vehicle and set 
themselves up as taxi-drivers. A similar 
pattern is evident in Pojan, where many 
micro-enterprises are migrant-financed 
and/or returnee-owned. Typical businesses 
are ‘the tractor, the shop and the filling-
station’ (Nicholson 2004). Overall, in both 
research sites, there are very few cases of 
innovative investment by migrants, 
although one can observe the beginnings of 
an agricultural revival in south-east Albania 
linked to the local tradition of specialised 
apple production (see also Vullnetari 
2008).   
 
In both countries a highly significant 
financial event had negatively affected 
migrants’ attitude to savings and to banks. 
In Albania this was the collapse of several 
private savings schemes in early 1997; a 
financial meltdown which bankrupted 
maybe half of Albanian households and 
halved the national GDP (Olsen 2000: 24). 
In the absence of a proper and efficient 
banking sector, these schemes had 
mushroomed in the competition for 
migrants’ savings by trying to outbid each 
other through the offer of increasingly 
unrealistic interest rates, which could only 
be sustained, and only for a time, by raking 
in new investors. Many migrants lost most 
or all of their savings when the elaborate 
scam imploded, and a new wave of 
emigration resulted.  
 
In Ecuador the key event was the 
dollarisation of the economy in January 
2000. This severely devalued the sucre (set 
at 25,000 to the dollar) so that all those 
(the majority) of migrants who held their 
savings in Ecuador in sucres lost much of 
the value of their capital (Beckerman and 
Solimano 2002). As one female recipient, 
the mother of three migrants in the US, put 
it rather bluntly: ‘dollarisation fucked it all’.  
As in post-pyramid Albania, dollarisation set 
in motion a renewed wave of migration.  
 
Gifts and in-kind remittances 
 
In both surveys, almost exactly half the 
respondents replied that they had received 
in-kind remittances from their migrant 
relatives abroad. In Pojan these took the 
form, in descending order of importance, of 
clothes, food, medical supplies and 
electronic appliances; in Xarbán the order 
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was clothes, technology (especially 
laptops), and toys – food and medicines 
were hardly mentioned.  The different 
patterns are partly influenced by the 
distance factor (hence cost of shipment) 
and partly by what was available and ‘good 
value’ in the respective home and host 
countries. 
 
In Pojan clothes were widely seen as 
popular and acceptable gifts, not only new 
ones but also, for poorer families, such as 
the Roma and Evgjit groups, second-hand 
clothes sent or brought from Greece. Food 
is usually brought back when migrants visit 
and is designated not only for non-migrant 
family members but also for the visiting 
migrants during their stay in the village. The 
explanations given are that some food 
products from Greece are higher quality 
and cheaper in price, since there is a view 
that Albania is used as dumping-ground for 
low-quality products from other countries 
and food prices are high because so much 
is imported. A typical quote from a migrant 
interviewed in Thessaloniki: 
 
We take food, every time we go we take 
food with us. And clothes. And anything 
else they want. We ask them before we 
leave what they want and we take what 
they tell us. Also medicine for my 
mother-in-law, because she suffers 
from headaches (Anila, female, 25). 
 
Clearly for Albanians with documents who 
are able to make the 3-4 hour journey by 
car and load up everything they want to 
take, carrying goods and gifts back to their 
relatives is rather easy. Urim (50), whom we 
quoted earlier, gave an even wider range of 
in-kind remittances that he had taken back 
to the village: 
 
Besides money, we also send clothes, 
because they are cheaper here [in 
Thessaloniki]. I also buy some 
medicine for my mother because she 
has problems with her blood 
pressure… Food – when we go we stay 
there two or three days and take food 
with us, especially so we can use 
ourselves whilst we are there. Not that 
the food is no good there, food there is 
usually tastier without a doubt. But we 
buy it here because it is often 
cheaper… for instance, the tomatoes, 
the lemons and olive oil are usually 
cheaper here… I have also taken water 
pumps there and heaters because they 
are cheaper here.   
 
In-kind remittances are also popular 
choices for secondary-dyad transfers, 
notably for female migrants in Greece to 
convey back to their relatives, especially 
mothers and sisters.  The notion that they 
are ‘small gifts’ means that they do not 
threaten the tradition of males 
monopolising the (financial) remittance 
process. Some of these presents were 
actually quite substantial and included, in 
our data, a fridge, a washing machine, a TV 
set, furniture and jewellery. Sometimes 
gendered tensions arise over the nature of 
these in-kind transfers. For instance a 
husband working on his own abroad might 
want to bring back agricultural equipment 
to improve the farm, whereas his village-
bound wife might prefer goods for the 
house such as items of furniture or ‘white’ 
goods. A similar disagreement might arise 
between a middle-aged or elderly recipient 
couple as to what their son might bring 
from Greece. Zana, a middle-aged mother, 
described rather ruefully how her son had 
brought over lots of ‘metal’ from Greece, 
including a combine-harvester which took 
him three days to drive from Greece, and a 
watering system for the orchard, so that her 
husband could expand the family’s farming 
activity.  
 
In Xarbán the distance factor obviously 
discourages large and fragile items from 
being sent since the packaging, freight and 
insurance costs are so high. Clothes and 
shoes are the most common in-kind 
remittance, by some measure over all 
others.  Even so, most recipients prefer 
money. Informants agree that any price 
difference is wiped out by the postage cost. 
Moreover, the inflow of remittance cash has 
stimulated the growth of modern clothes 
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shops in nearby towns. Money is also 
preferred by families whose migrants have 
been away for a long time and are unaware 
of their relatives’ current fashion tastes.  
Oswaldo migrated to the US when his two 
daughters were young teenagers: 
 
I cannot send them clothes, I don’t 
know their sizes. I’ve been here so long 
I still think of them as my little girls, 
and now they have babies of their own! 
(OC, 51, New York in the US since 
1994). 
 
Whilst food is not sent to Xarbán, it is sent 
the other way, in an incessant stream of 
food parcels as ‘reverse in-kind 
remittances’ (cf. Mazzucato 2009). These 
parcels contain not just sustenance for 
working bodies but culturally and 
symbolically loaded ‘stuff’ such as cuy 
(guinea-pig) which ‘travels well’, as well as 
pollera skirts for the re-creation of the 
fiesta in New York.  
 
Collective remittances 
 
The fiesta in Xarbán is the main destination 
for collective remittances, one of Goldring’s 
(2004) three main remittance types.  
Collective remittances are far more 
important in Xarbán, where 64 per cent of 
the 213 migrants recorded by the 
questionnaire survey sent remittances of 
this type, than they are in Albania, where 
this kind of transfer hardly registers. 
Donations for the Xarbán fiesta are made 
through collective organisation in New York, 
with each migrant’s contribution carefully 
noted. Community events are also 
organised to help raise money for the main 
fiesta back in the village, which is now 
largely funded by donations from the US. 
Elaborate control mechanisms – photos, 
videos, detailed descriptive accounts and 
‘transnational gossiping’ (Dreby 2009) – 
enable the donors to check if their money is 
being used according to their wishes and 
instructions. 
 
None of this happens in Albania. There was 
no instance of collective remittance 
initiative in the survey villages, nor had the 
villagers formed anything approaching a 
‘hometown association’ in Thessaloniki. 
Two obstacles were mentioned repeatedly 
in interviews. First, respondents felt that, 
with the cost of living Greece and the needs 
of their relatives in Albania, there was no 
money left over from community projects. 
Second, there was a widespread lack of 
trust in anyone who would try to coordinate 
or manage such a scheme. Any mention of 
local government involvement, or a 
‘committee’, made people cringe or laugh 
cynically. Behind this resoundingly 
unenthusiastic reaction lie two further 
background factors. First, the memory of 
the rejected communist past, where there 
was a kind of ‘imposed’ collective ethos, 
means that cooperation remains 
anathema. Second, respondents consider 
the post-communist history of governance 
as too corrupt, and some referred to 
various local and national affairs of 
nepotism and skulduggery.  
 
Social remittances and gender 
 
Following Levitt’s (1998) foundational 
statement, ‘social remittances’ has become 
a successful and widely-used concept that, 
paradoxically, has not been theoretically 
developed (but see Levitt and Lamba-
Nieves 2011) or empirically applied.  Key 
elements of social remittances, according 
to Levitt, are ‘normative structures (which) 
are ideas, values and beliefs’, and ‘systems 
of practice (which) are the actions shaped 
by normative structures’ (1998: 933-934). 
Rather surprisingly Levitt did not mention 
gender in her 1998 article, and it gets only 
fleeting mention in the ‘update’ paper 
(Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011: 5). This is 
all the more surprising since Levitt exhibits 
great sensitivity to gender issues in her 
many other writings. More important, it is 
easy to conceive of gendered relations both 
as a normative structure (e.g. that of 
patriarchy) and as a system of practice – 
through the casual or routinised encounters 
and gendered divisions of quotidian social 
roles, or as exemplified in the gendered 
remittance dyads we have discussed in this 
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paper. 
Using the trope of gender also allows us to 
engage in an interesting reflexive debate 
about the linearity vs. circularity of the 
‘practice’ of social remittances, and to play 
this off against another reciprocal 
relationship, that between social 
remittances and gender. Let us explain. In 
Levitt’s original formulation, social 
remittances were seen as ‘north-to-south’ 
transfers of ‘behaviours, identities and 
social capital’ (1998: 927) that assumed a 
one-way linearity, seen most clearly in the 
‘hometown’ literature (cf. Alarcon 2000; 
Goldring 2004). Although the innate 
breadth and malleability of the term has 
allowed it to evolve into a number of 
materialisations, ranging from culture (e.g. 
music, dress codes etc.), to technological 
transfers (e.g. use of agricultural machinery 
or familiarity with computers through 
laptops sent as gifts), to the currently 
fashionable notion of ‘mobilising the 
diaspora’ for developmental purposes, the 
essential linearity of all these hypothesised 
transfer processes is clear.  In order to 
avoid reductionist and unrealistic notions of 
change and development, social 
remittances must not be conceptualised as 
one-way traffic.  Instead, following Levitt 
and Lamba-Nieves (2011), we conceive 
social remittances as ideational resources 
being continually crafted in their (circular) 
motion. People’s values and experiences 
before migration strongly influence what 
they do and how they behave in the 
migration destination; and non-migrants 
who are supposed to ‘receive’ social 
remittances are not blank canvasses, but 
active agents in the process.  In the words 
of Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011: 3): 
 
Social remittances… circulate 
continuously. What migrants bring and 
continuously receive from their 
homelands affects their experiences in 
the countries where they settle.  This, in 
turn, affects what they send back to 
non-migrants who either disregard or 
adopt these ideas and behaviours, 
transforming them in the process, and 
eventually re-remitting them back to 
migrants who adopt and transform 
them once again.   
 
We now use gender to illustrate this 
recursive circularity, and to demonstrate 
that, at least for the two migration and 
(social) remittance corridors under study, 
changes in gender relationships and power 
dynamics are rather small. In following 
through on gender norms and practices as 
a key embodiment of social remittances, 
we adopt what is now the mainstream 
discourse on migration and gender, which 
focuses on how various ‘gender regimes’ 
within both sending and host societies act 
to shape and are themselves shaped by 
migratory processes (Pessar and Mahler 
2003). Thus we see migration as a dynamic 
social process containing key sites of social 
change and conflict with strong 
implications for gender ideologies and 
practices.  These ‘implications’, however, do 
not automatically presage empowerment or 
liberatory experiences for women; indeed, 
the reverse can hold true. We also, in what 
follows, disassemble the Euro-American 
false dichotomy between societies seen as 
situated in the ‘underdeveloped’, 
‘traditional’ global South and those of the 
‘developed’, ‘modern’, ‘democratic’ global 
North of the US and Western Europe; a 
construction which obscures far more 
complex, interactive processes (Phizacklea 
2003: 25). 
 
Both sending societies – Xarbán/Ecuador 
and Pojan/Albania – are essentially 
patriarchal and this patriarchality frames 
the migration process, which was male-
dominated from the start in both contexts. 
Male-dominated in two senses. First, males 
made up the vast majority of the migrants; 
this has held true subsequently for Xarbán, 
but less so for Pojan where women have 
joined the early male-only flows. Second, 
men have orchestrated the decision-making 
process as to who should migrate, 
determining that their wives and daughters 
stay at home, or only join them under the 
gendered and constrained mechanism of 
family reunion. The latter option has been 
made possible by regularisation schemes in 
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Greece (and Italy) for Albanians (and other) 
immigrants, allowing the now-legal male 
migrant to bring in other family members. 
This option has not been offered in the US 
where most Ecuadorians remain irregular, 
discouraging family reunion and female 
migration.  Nevertheless, there are 
indications that patriarchal control over 
female migration in Ecuador is far from 
absolute, since there has been extensive 
female migration from other parts of 
Ecuador to Spain, Italy and elsewhere 
(Gratton 2007; Mata-Codesal 2011), and 
independent female migration has 
occurred from other parts of South America 
too (Bastia and Brusse 2011; see also 
Pessar 1999). The conclusion, therefore, is 
that in the case of Xarbán, the male 
dominance of migration results from the 
interaction of patriarchy, the particular 
destination of this village’s migrants (the 
US), and the continuing ‘irregular’ nature of 
this migration chain. For Albania, the 
patriarchal shaping of migration appears 
much stronger:  independent female 
migration is rare in rural areas across the 
country. Most young women who move 
abroad on their own are university students 
or graduates pursuing higher degrees and 
professional careers, and they come almost 
exclusively from well-off urban backgrounds 
in Albania (Vullnetari 2007:  44).  
 
Let us examine the Albanian case in more 
detail. Social remittance exchanges occur 
when migrants return to visit or resettle in 
their origin communities, through non-
migrants’ visits to their relatives abroad, 
and through reciprocal letters, telephone 
calls, videos and the internet (Levitt 1998:  
936). Given the proximity of Pojan to 
Thessaloniki and Greece, and the relative 
ease of travel (nowadays by car, shared taxi 
or bus), one would expect transnational 
contacts to be fairly intense. On the whole 
this is the case, although undocumented 
migrants are less able to return and be 
visited, and many migrants are working too 
hard, with long hours, to make regular 
returns. The other fact to bear in mind with 
the Greek-Albanian case is that socio-
cultural differences between the two 
countries are not that great. True, the 
economic gradient is sufficient to present 
migration as a ‘rational choice’ for many 
rural Albanians; above all this reflects the 
dire state of the Albanian economy, 
especially during the 1990s. And it is also 
true that religion plays a different role in 
the two societies in the way in which it 
fashions (or does not in Albania) national 
identity. But both countries belong to the 
Balkan realm of ‘heavy’ patriarchal family 
structures (Brunnbauer 2000; Halpern et 
al. 1996), so the gender re-ordering that 
might be expected from migrants 
experiencing life in a gender-egalitarian 
society has little chance to occur. The 
following quote from Alket (male, 47) is 
useful because it comes from someone 
whose age interposes him between two 
generations – older left-behind parents 
with memories of the ‘old times’ under 
communism when the family was the last 
bastion of the private sphere, and younger-
generation migrants and non-migrants who 
have had most of their lives in the post-
communist years. Alket starts off by 
paraphrasing the discourse of the older 
generation in the village, and then 
describes the strictures of his own family 
life in Thessaloniki:   
 
The father says to his son:  ‘Listen here 
my son, I have raised you and I know 
you well, but since you went to Greece, 
I don’t know, but you seem to take your 
wife’s side all the time, you listen to her 
more’. They [the older villagers] just 
stare at us…they don’t grasp what we 
are saying to them, when we explain 
the [tough] life in Greece and the 
conditions we live in – that all those 
who live in Greece, Italy or anywhere 
else have a similar experiences. My 
wife comes home at six in the evening. 
Who will cook and clean for me? If the 
kids are young who will look after 
them? But they [villagers] don’t 
understand… 
 
The Albanian case also illustrates how 
social remittances interact with patterns of 
utilisation of financial remittances. For 
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instance, a switch might occur from wholly 
‘consumption’ expenditure (food, clothing, 
furniture, household goods etc.) to 
investment in a business as a more 
‘entrepreneurial’ spirit develops, especially 
among younger migrants. A good 
illustration of this comes from Besmir (24), 
who is using his earnings and work 
experience in Greece, where he has worked 
in both plumbing and retailing, to develop 
the family apple orchard in the village: 
 
When I go home I take pesticides for 
the apple trees, pumps and pipes for 
the watering system. I have built the 
watering system myself with the 
methods that I learned where I worked 
here…My father calls me and tells me 
that we need this and that … I go to an 
agricultural suppliers, I tell them what I 
need and they package it up and I take 
it to Albania.  [If I cannot go myself] I 
pay about €20-30 for the load to the 
taxi driver [to deliver it]… We have 
plans to build a cooled storage unit for 
the apples. I have enquired here [in 
Greece] so that we can export the 
apples, as I used to work in a 
supermarket chain here… We’ll see. 
 
Switching the line of analysis and 
redirecting our gaze back to the villages of 
Pojan, what have been the effects of 
remittances on remaking gender-household 
dynamics? First we have seen that, despite 
the prevailing male management of the 
remittance process, two gendered effects 
have been observed. First, some women 
have been ‘allowed’, or have insisted, or 
have resolved to ‘secret’ means, to send 
remittances themselves, generally to their 
parents or sisters. Although these 
remittances are labelled as ‘gifts’ and are 
often in-kind or, if in cash, are small 
amounts described as ‘just for a coffee’, 
their significance should not be 
downplayed. Second, the migration of 
husbands has turned wives into remittance 
receivers – in fact in the questionnaire 
survey 58 per cent of receivers are women. 
If the husband is away throughout the year, 
visiting only sporadically, this gives the 
woman the sole responsibility of managing 
the remittances and the rest of the 
household – children, garden, livestock, 
etc. Whether this is empowering or not is a 
moot point. Many of the women surveyed 
and interviewed regard their position as 
bearing an extra weight of responsibilities 
which they cannot share with their 
husbands. Family separation has its 
emotional costs not only for the woman but 
also for the children who lack a father-
figure in their everyday lives. The 
mother/wife is left with a potentially long 
list of tasks, responsibilities and duties, 
which may also include working the land 
and looking after elderly relatives. The 
overall effect is to increase women’s 
burden rather than facilitate their 
emancipation (Vullnetari and King 2011). 
 
For Xarbán, many of the points made above 
about Pojan apply. These points of 
similarity result from a migration process 
which has been, and remains, led by males, 
and set within a home society where men 
are accorded more power and status than 
women. The difference in settings between 
the two studies lies in the physical and 
cultural distance between the two 
respective home and host societies (much 
greater in the case of Xarbán-New York) 
and the fact that, whereas in Greece 
Albanians have integrated rather 
completely (despite the host society’s 
antipathy towards Albanians), in New York 
Ecuadorians remain undocumented and 
live in a largely Ecuadorian/Hispanic 
enclave where their home traditions and 
ways of living are perpetuated, albeit not 
within a family setting. 
 
As for the impact of migration and 
remittances on gender relations, we note 
the same influences as in Pojan – more 
female decision-making in the 
management of the household due to the 
incoming remittances and the absence of 
the man/men of the family. If anything the 
transfer of this responsibility is more 
marked because of the husband’s longer 
duration of absence. When 
husbands/fathers return, we observe a 
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somewhat greater involvement in 
household chores because of their ‘forced 
training’ at these tasks whilst abroad in a 
largely men-only living environment. Here is 
an example from a returnee who had been 
in Queens, responding to the questions 
about whether he had brought any 
‘American’ habits back from his time in the 
US: 
 
Mmm…well, the habit I brought is that 
one has to do everything in the house – 
cooking, washing, ironing [laughs], 
because … if you want to save money, 
you have to do all those things yourself. 
You get used to it. So, here [in Xarbán] I 
continue to wash-up, cook. This is more 
than a habit, it is an obligation … and it 
is much better because here it is in 
your home (RC, 42, married returned 
migrant from Queens, where he lived 
for long spells between 1989 and 
2003). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We start our conclusion by providing two 
generalised pictures – stereotypes, if you 
will – of typical Xarbán and Pojan migrants 
and their changing migration and remitting 
profiles over time. 
 
The average Xarbán migrant in the US is a 
married migrant whose wife and children 
stay in the village. He does not have legal 
status in the US, and has little chance to 
acquire it. His main migration target, 
beyond supporting his family, is to build his 
house in Xarbán and save enough money to 
make a living in the village without having 
to engage in further migration. In order to 
get to New York he needs to pay $15,000 
or more. In Queens some relatives will 
provide him with shelter and contacts to 
find a job. He usually starts working in 
construction, in a car-wash or some other 
menial job. His first obligation is to pay off 
his family debt, which takes around two  
years.  Once the debt is repaid, the second 
phase begins; but the trajectory blurs at 
this point and leads in three potential 
directions. Some migrants think about 
bringing in their wives and older children, 
incurring new journey debts which prevent 
them from saving.  Others return to 
Ecuador, either because they finished the 
house and have plans for a small business, 
or because an occupational injury (frequent 
in the construction industry) forces them 
back. The third group are those who stay on 
in New York, facing an uncertain future 
given their irregular status. They may 
become more attuned to the ‘American 
lifestyle’ and remittances may drop off due 
to other expenses and weakening affective 
ties.  Once they no longer work, they will 
find it difficult to meet their needs and so 
they may have to return.   
 
The Albanian migration scenario to Greece 
is more diversified because the possibility 
of acquiring legal status after 1998 brings 
new migration arrangements, above all the 
reunion of spouse and children.  Based on 
the Pojan fieldwork, the typical biography 
runs as follows. Our migrant leaves in the 
early or mid 1990s and walks over the 
mountains of Greece, where he finds 
casual work in farming, construction or 
general labouring; these early migrations 
might be to-and-fro seasonal moves. Once 
he has obtained papers through one of the 
legalisation schemes, he can get married 
and bring over his wife or, if already 
married, his wife and children.  The 
remittance patterns change according to 
his marital status and, if married, where the 
spouse is living.  Three main remittance 
dyads exist, reflecting the above changing 
circumstances.  If he is single he remits to 
his father; if he is married, with his wife in 
the village, he remits to her, unless she is 
living in the house of his father; if he is 
married with his wife abroad, he remits to 
his parents, but small amounts. As his 
children move into the Greek school 
system, the likelihood of return decreases, 
but a transnational lifestyle is possible, up 
to a point, because of the closeness of 
Albania, and particularly Pojan, to Greece. 
 
These two biographical sketches 
demonstrate, firstly, how the migrations 
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from Pojan and Xarbán have evolved as 
sharply gendered, male-led processes; and 
secondly, how these gendered moves and 
transnational relations have clearly defined 
the remitting dyads along gendered – 
mainly male-lines, at least for these two 
migration and remittance corridors. The 
extent to which these patterns can be 
generalised for wider geographic areas 
remains questionable. Elsewhere in 
Ecuador, and from other parts of the wider 
Andean region, much recent migration is 
female-led, especially that to Europe 
(Bastia and Busse 2011; Gratton 2007); 
their remittance dyads and gender relations 
would map out very differently from what 
we have described here. On the other hand 
the Xarbán findings are closely mirrored in 
Pribilsky’s (2004) study of Ecuadorian 
migration and transnational gendered 
relations in New York City, when he 
described interesting examples of ‘male 
domesticity’ which clearly modify traditional 
gender roles. Meanwhile Jones and de la 
Torre (2011) have documented the same 
kind of fall-off in economic and social 
remittances as recorded in Xarbán, 
amongst Bolivian men who have been 
abroad for ten years or more.  
 
The Albanian case-study is probably more 
widely representative of Albanian 
emigration and remittance trends, which 
are relatively uniform across this much 
smaller country (De Soto et al. 2002; de 
Zwager et al. 2005). The distinctive 
features of Pojan are its closeness to the 
Greek border, and therefore the relative 
lack of migration here to other destinations 
such as Italy and the UK (from where 
remittance returns are generally higher, 
due to higher wages), and the role of 
seasonal migration (again, a reflection of 
proximity to Greece).  
 
Our final point of discussion returns us to 
the bigger questions about the nature of 
the relationship between migration and 
(under)development raised in the 
introduction. How are remittances to be 
seen within the broader perspective of the 
evolving global economic system? How do 
our two case studies shed light on this 
question? 
 
Glick Schiller (2011: 40-42) points out that 
migration cannot be regarded as a sui 
generis activity with an internal logic that 
can be studied in isolation without 
reference to the global-local interface of the 
reconstitution of capital. Remittance flows, 
she says, have to be placed within 
transnational social fields of unequal 
power. This leads to a dual perspective on 
the role of remittances in relation to 
neoliberal economic restructuring with 
effects at both ends of the remittance 
corridor. The retreat of the state from 
welfare provision in many ‘developed’ 
societies leaves open employment niches 
which are filled by (mostly female) 
migrants, especially in the care and health 
sectors, whilst the deregulation or non-
regulation of the economy leaves an equally 
open space for (mostly male) migrants in 
sectors like agriculture, construction, 
maintenance and repair work. In sending 
countries, analogously, the impact of the 
privatisation of public services (notably 
education and health) is cushioned by 
remittance transfers which enable 
beneficiaries to have some access to these 
now-marketised sectors.  
 
The second effect is whether migration and 
remittances increase or decrease social 
and locational inequality. Here the evidence 
is far from clear-cut, and much depends on 
local context, scale of analysis, and time 
period (cf. Jones 1998). If the ‘poorest of 
the poor’ migrate then remittances can 
have an equalising effect.  If the resources 
need to finance migration are such that not 
everyone can afford to go, then migration 
and remittances may well exacerbate social 
inequality in the sending communities. 
Meanwhile in the destination setting, 
migrants, who concentrate in low-wage 
casual jobs, contribute a new marginalised 
labouring class on the fringes of the host 
society, thereby reproducing inequality in 
this setting too. 
 
This leads to a wider-scale question:  how 
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do remittances contribute to remaking the 
relationship between poor, remittance-
receiving countries, and the richer migrant 
host countries?  Once again, this can be 
approached at two levels. First, at the 
micro-level of individual migrants and their 
family and community networks. As a result 
of living abroad, migrants develop certain 
expectations of what is acceptable and 
what is not, especially as regards the 
possibility to achieve a ‘normal’ life. The 
combination of material and social 
remittances has mainly worked to generate 
more migration – or at least to foster the 
desire to emigrate – amongst the younger 
generation. This dependency-cycle of 
migration will continue as long as factors 
such as local unemployment, limited career 
prospects, remoteness and poor 
infrastructure continue to plague the 
sending areas. Meantime, employment 
abroad and depending on remittances 
continue to form the basis for survival for 
local communities such as Pojan and 
Xarbán. 
 
In terms of the international political 
economy of remittances, the dependency 
relationship is equally clear, and 
demonstrates that an economic model 
based on labour-export and remittances-led 
growth tends to result in a boxed-in form of 
dependency for the migrant-origin country 
in which real growth, as opposed to 
remittance-led economic survival, is 
difficult to achieve. This position is argued, 
with perhaps excessive conviction, by 
Delgado Wise and Márquez  Covarrubias 
(2008; 2011: 69-77) for the case of the US-
Mexico corridor, seen as an ‘asymmetric 
and subordinated’ regional integration and 
migration regime. This characterisation of 
Mexico’s position within the United States’ 
internationalised but highly segmented 
labour market equally holds for Ecuador. 
Here the various components of 
neoliberalism – privatisation, deregulation, 
structural adjustment, dollarisation etc. – 
have led to a ‘devalorisation’ of labour, both 
in the sending context, where it is 
generated as an unwanted surplus (in 
economic terms), and in the US where it 
enters employment niches under conditions 
of extreme precariousness (Delgado Wise 
and Márquez  Covarrubias 2011: 58-60). In 
this scenario, remittances have a social 
meaning beyond their monetary 
manifestation. Paraphrasing these same 
authors (2011: 65), remittances emerge as 
an expression of the stretching of the social 
relations of production across the globe 
and in a context of super-exploitation and 
social exclusion of migrant workers. Rather 
than an instrument of development, 
remittances represent a fraction of wage-
income designated to cover the 
subsistence of family dependents who live 
in the places of origin. 
 
This neo-Marxist explanatory framework 
also holds true, to some extent, we 
contend, for the Albania-Greece corridor, 
although with some modifications. Rather 
than a globe-spanning migration and 
remittance system, the Albania-Greek one 
is a relationship between close neighbours. 
The dominance of each country in the 
other’s migration system (most Albanian 
emigrants are in Greece, most immigrants 
in Greece are Albanians) perhaps implies a 
greater mutual dependency or even 
symbiosis (Baldwin-Edwards 2004; Fakolas 
2000). Albanians have become a structural 
component of the Greek economy’s labour 
force, synonymous with an ‘army’ of willing 
labourers available to do any job, at any 
time, at any place, at minimal wage 
remuneration. So much so that, if a Greek 
wants his or her house cleaned, garden 
tidied, furniture moved, flat decorated etc., 
they will ask a friend:  ‘do you know any 
Albanians?’ On the other hand the current 
extreme fragility of the Greek economy in 
this post-Olympics, economic crisis state, 
means that Albanian immigrants are the 
first to feel the pinch as their mostly casual 
labour is dispensed with. Although 
remittances do have something of a shock-
absorbing, counter-cyclical role, there are 
limits to this function if the migrants’ 
access to paid work is reduced.  
 
Summing up, this paper has offered a rare 
example of a comparative analysis of 
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migration and remittance dynamics in two 
contrasting global settings (for others see 
Bastia and Busse 2011; Menjivar and 
Agadjanian 2007). We have deployed the 
socio-spatial notions of corridors and dyads 
to excavate the family dynamics of 
remittance transfers, so often hidden inside 
the black box of monetary sums and 
spending patterns. Despite the differences 
in family settings, we have found more 
similarities than differences in the results 
from the two studies.  
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